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Animals as Social Actors 
Cases of equid resistance in the ancient Near East 
Laerke Recht 
 
Abstract: This paper examines the concept of animals as social actors in the ancient 
Near East through a case study of human-equid relations. In particular, examples where 
equids may be seen as expressing resistance, as depicted in the iconography of the third 
and second millennia BCE, are analysed. The first part of the paper discusses how 
animals have been perceived in scholarly debates in philosophy, archaeology and human-
animal studies. It is argued that an acknowledgement of animals as social actors can 
improve our understanding of the human past, and the relation of humans to their 
broader environment. The second part of the paper presents three examples from the 
ancient Near East where equids may be interpreted as pushing back or resisting the 
boundaries placed by humans, resulting in a re-negotiation of the relationship. 
 
Introduction 
Animals have always permeated our lives. 1  Although often ignored or unrealised, 
nonhuman animals feature in every part of day-to-day living: our language is saturated 
with animal imagery and references, all art forms contain them and our material culture is 
full of animals and products derived from them (for a long list of examples, see Bryant 
2008). The web of interactions between humans and other animals means that the 
human perception of animals is highly varied and sometimes contradictory, from one 
people to another, from one person to another, and even within individuals. Animals 
may be seen as mere objects, relating to practicality, production and economics, as 
companions and pets, as adversaries, as equals and as status symbols. This is not only 
true of modern times, where their many presences and influences are perhaps more easily 
forgotten. In ancient times, nonhuman animals were at least as significant a part of 
human existence as they are today. They provided obvious products of subsistence in the 
form of meat, wool, skin, blood and milk, as well as transportation and traction/labour. 
Our earliest textual records concern themselves mostly with animals and animal 
products, and the earliest iconographic material from almost any part of the world 
depicts more animals than it does humans. 
Correspondingly, human interactions with other animals constitute a complex map of 
relations, some more interactive than others – including killing, eating, abusing, skinning, 
milking, loving, respecting, honouring, adoring, worshipping, riding, leading, taming, 
setting free, feeding, breeding, training, playing, having intercourse, fighting, 
experimenting. The interaction occurring depends on factors such as time, place, cultural 
background, the kind of animal and the individual human being, and may appear 
contradictory. The same person may love and cherish their pet pig, yet one day send it to 
                                                
1 This paper is part of a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship entitled The Spirited Horse: Human-equid relations in the 
Bronze Age Near East (H2020, project TSH 741303); I am most grateful for the support of H2020 and Augusta 
McMahon. I also thank Ioanna Moutafi for graciously reading and commenting on a previous draft of the paper, and 
the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions, which helped me clarify the argument.	
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the slaughter-house and later eat its meat. A loved companion dog may be beaten for 
some perceived insolence. In a way, these are merely extensions of the generally complex 
and contradictory nature of human behaviour, but they highlight the variety of ways in 
which we interact. Mapping these relations are therefore important elements in 
understanding human lifeways in the past. 
In this paper, I begin from this view of animals as a constant and necessary presence in 
human existence. I outline the concept of animals as social actors and the implications 
that this might have for how we approach our study of the past and how humans 
negotiate relations with their surroundings. In the second part of the paper, I want to 
show how a view of animals as social actors might be detected in the material culture by 
presenting a case study consisting of three examples of human-equid interaction in the 
ancient Near East. The focus is on one specific type of encounter: that of animal 
resistance. This is only one of many kinds of interactions.2 I have chosen resistance 
because it is one of the most powerfully expressed encounters, and a particularly vivid 
illustration of active animal engagement with humans. It is one where animals do not 
easily or willingly adapt to the boundaries set by humans, and thus may give rise to minor 
or major conflicts. For now, the emphasis is on the very existence and expression of 
such resistance; and the hope is that this will in turn open discussion about possible 
reasons behind it, along with the ancient human responses. The material under 
discussion is iconographic and largely comes from the third millennium BCE, with forays 
into the second millennium.  
 
Humans and other animals 
Philosophical discussions of animals go far back (Engel Jr. and Jenni 2010). In a 
remarkably subtle manner, Pythagoras allegedly believed that “The souls of animals 
called unreasoning are reasonable, not however with active reasoning powers, because of 
an imperfect mixture of the bodies and because they do not have the power of speech, as 
in the case of apes and dogs; for these have intelligence but not the power of speech” 
(Fairbanks 1898: 150-151). Mostly, however, the topic of animals is used as an opposite 
to define humans – that is, as a dichotomy, with ‘human’ on one (superior) side and 
‘animal’ on the other (inferior) side, with animals seen as passive, amoral and irrational 
objects acting only on instinct. Hegel explicitly calls animals “anti-human” (Hegel 1998: 
43) and Kant thought that humans are “through rank and dignity an entirely different 
being from things, such as irrational animals, with which one can do as one likes” (original 
emphasis, Kant 2010: 239; see also Kant 1997: 112. Cf. Derrida 2002: 399-400 on 
humans having taken the word ‘animal’ for themselves, to identify themselves). The most 
influential work of all is probably Descartes’ comparison of animals with machines, 
clearly opposed to mind or soul as a human faculty (Descartes 1850: 98). These attitudes 
serve to marginalise animals and ignore the profound impact they have on every facet of 
human society. The associated rhetoric is also the kind that is in danger of being used for 
justifying abuse and cruelty towards animals (notice the difference outlined between 
anthropocentrism and speciesism in Boyd 2017). 
In archaeology, research has tended to follow this general notion of animals as mostly of 
practical and economic value – that is, values that follow rational human thought. Studies 
                                                
2 A full discussion of all types of human-animal interactions is much beyond the scope of the current paper. More 
extensive research on this topic will appear in future publications of the TSH project.	
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therefore focus on pastoralism, production, hunting/trapping and agriculture, although 
this has started to change. Archaeological finds are explained according to a logic that 
assumes rational use, usually based on economic factors. These studies are of course 
immensely valuable in contributing to our understanding of the ancient world. However, 
a more inclusive approach would provide a broader picture of the past, reflecting and 
acknowledging the variety of interactions and social players. In the last decades, there has 
been an increased awareness of and interest in these aspects in archaeological research, 
with some suggestions concerning how to begin to detect and interpret it in the 
archaeological record (see e.g. Ingold 1994, Arbuckle & McCarty 2014, Harris & 
Hamilakis 2014, Boyd 2017). 
Much modern research in the field of human-animal studies also seeks to transcend the 
deep-rooted Cartesian model, especially in the fields of anthropology, sociology, animal 
rights groups and work focussing on ethics (DeMello 2010; Baker 2001; Walker 2008; 
Flynn 2008; Fudge 2002; Walker 2008; Calarco and Atterton 2004). In recent years, the 
awareness of this new work done on human-animal relations has opened the way for 
alternative interpretations, seeing animals as more than simple objects. Although various 
types of killing may be the most common interaction between humans and other animals 
(Animal Studies Group 2006), anthropological studies present us with a multitude of 
human approaches to other animals. Evans-Pritchard has famously shown how cattle are 
absolutely central to Nuer society, to the extent that members might be identified by 
reference to a specific ox, rather than the other way around (Evans-Pritchard 1956). 
Staying on the African continent, Malawians do not even have a category equivalent to 
‘animal’ – the closest comparable division is one that involves entities that have life and 
those that do not. The things that have life, however, include not only animals, but also 
trees, spirit entities, souls of the dead, edible mushrooms, rain and soil  (Morris 2000: 
140-141). Rather than have a broad category of ‘animals’, they have categories such as 
‘edible quadruped’, ‘birds’, ‘intestinal worms’, ‘fish, edible crustaceans, snakes’ and 
‘useless organisms’ (Morris 2000: 144). These reflect the Malawi way of life and present a 
radically different perception of the world and emphasise the fact that not all animals are 
the same. In Amerindian thought, animals are seen as persons – or more accurately, 
some types of animals are understood by humans as conceiving themselves as persons:  
[Animals] perceive themselves as (or become) anthropomorphic beings 
when they are in their own houses or villages and they experience their 
own habits and characteristics in the form of culture – they see their 
food as human food (jaguars see blood as manioc beer, vultures see the 
maggots in rotting meat as grilled fish, etc.), they see their bodily 
attributes (fur, feathers, claws, beaks etc.) as body decorations or 
cultural instruments, they see their social system as organized in the 
same way as human institutions are (with chiefs, shamans, ceremonies, 
exogamous moieties etc.) (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 470). 
This is a wonderful instance of animals being seen as full-blown social actors within their 
own society, with human concerns and attitudes (although admittedly within an 
inescapably human cognitive framework). In the modern Western world, we do not tend 
to conceptually integrate animals into our everyday lives in the same degree, but it is 
precisely these intriguing cases that transcend our usual perception of animals as passive 
objects that I am interested in. 
 
The dangers of ‘animal’ 
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Two important caveats should be noted. Firstly, the word ‘animals’ of course includes 
humans. However, in this paper, it refers specifically to nonhuman animals. I am fully 
aware that this does nothing to help the issue of the human-nonhuman animal 
dichotomy described above, but consider it preferable to the repeated use of the 
cumbersome alternative since the meaning is hopefully clear from the context of the 
discussion here.  
Secondly, the term ‘animal’ (or ‘the animal’ or ‘the Animal’) is not a simple or 
unproblematic word in what it encompasses. As Derrida would have it, 
Confined within this catch-all concept … are all the living things that man 
does not recognize as his fellows, his neighbors, or his brothers. And 
that is so in spite of the infinite space that separates the lizard from the 
dog, the protozoon from the dolphin, the shark from the lamb, the 
parrot from the chimpanzee, the camel from the eagle, the squirrel 
from the tiger or the elephant from the cat, the ant from the silkworm 
or the hedgehog from the echidna. (Derrida 2002: 402). 
It lumps together a large amount of hugely diverse life-forms into a single category, 
which robs animals of individuality and uniqueness when in fact not just species but each 
individual animal does possess specific characteristics, what we in a human would call 
their ‘personality’. This general category can thus easily become a tool of the 
dichotomous rhetoric that places humans opposite and superior to ‘animals’ (consider 
for a moment the implications of the ‘animal’ equivalent of ‘personality’; ‘animality’). The 
abolishment of the word is unlikely to change this conceptual gap, nor can (or should) its 
place as a significant category in modern Western thought so easily be abolished. Hence, 
I am using it here, but would ask readers to keep in mind the immense diversity that it 
always entails and refers to. 
 
What is a ‘social actor’? 
The concept of ‘social action’ is most commonly used in sociology and anthropology, but 
has also found its way into archaeology through various agency theories (Dornan 2002). 
It is variously defined as  
- “a type of behavior that is oriented to the behavior of another actor, and to 
which the actor attaches meaning” (Swedberg and Agevall 2005: 246, “social 
action”) 
- “Behavior which has meaning to the individual, that is, behavior which he directs 
toward a goal”; “Action oriented to or influenced by another person or persons” 
(Theodorson and Theodorson 1970: 4, “action” and “action, social”) 
- “Action is social when the actor behaves in such a manner that his action is 
intended to influence the actions of one or more other persons” (Mitchell 2006: 
2, “action; social action”) 
- “the capacity of human beings to affect their own life chances and those of 
others and to play a role in the formation of the social realities in which they 
participate” (Barfield 1997: 4, “agency or human agency”) 
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- “the capacity that all individual humans (or agents) have to actively shape and 
transform their world, with a degree of self-consciousness or awareness that sets 
them apart from other species” (Gardner 2009: 95) 
Social action is often placed in opposition to structure. Structure refers to the theory that 
behaviour is governed by the social systems in which a person – or animal – may find 
themselves, giving little credence to independent choice and action (Johnson 2000: 6). I 
am not here dismissing the forces of structures in determining behaviour – in fact, a 
blend of the two positions provide the best explanation, making them interdependent 
(Giddens 1979: 255), or as Gardner describes it “companions” (Gardner 2009: 95). This 
being said, I intend to shift the focus to individual, nonhuman animal agents, which may 
be restrained and reside within social structures, but nevertheless have and act upon 
individual autonomy. 
As definitions go, the above are in remarkable agreement, all emphasising the ability or 
perceived ability to shape one’s surroundings and that the action should be interactive, i.e. 
social. On top of this, there is a reference to the state of mind of the agent – ‘attaching 
meaning’, ‘directing behaviour’, ‘intending’, ‘self-consciousness’ and ‘awareness’ all 
suggest deliberation behind any actions performed. This element is probably the reason 
why social action is usually linked to humans – and explicitly so in Gardner’s article 
(Gardner 2009). However, the issue is murky. Are animals capable of self-consciousness? 
Various tests have been devised to answer this question, including the so-called ‘Mirror 
Test’3, which has been used with some advantage on chimpanzees and orangutans 
(Gallup 2005). The debate is a very heated one, with discussions not only on species 
close to humans – see for example contributions in Parker et al. 2006 and Beckoff et al. 
2002. Certainly, animals navigate social structures in ways similar to humans. As Mlekuž 
notes in reference to sheep, they are “skilled social players actively negotiating and 
renegotiating society and their positions within it” (2013: 152).  
Self-consciousness is at the extreme of the spectre of defining social action – a ‘softer’ 
version, which does involve a sense of deliberation, but not necessarily to the extent that 
it would constitute self-consciousness, may be more reasonable. This means a more 
inclusive approach, ensuring that actions performed without self-consciousness by agents 
with the capacity for self-consciousness are included, as well as actions performed by 
humans with limited or no capacity for self-consciousness (for example young children 
and people born with limited mental capacity). A social actor is thus an agent that 
deliberately (and more or less consciously) seeks to influence their world. They actively 
engage with other agents and their surroundings.  
Animals are thus seen as subjects, having motives and objectives, and with the ability to 
influence the world around them, including other agents such as humans. This influence 
can take many forms. Hribal, for example, writes about the many ways in which animals 
actively resist human interaction, perhaps the most explicit manner of attempting to shape 
their own worlds (Hribal 2007). The concept of resistance is a central feature of much 
theoretical literature on inequality and power relations (Paynter & McGuire 1991; Gailey 
                                                
3 The basic idea is to determine whether an animal recognises itself in a mirror. This is done by applying an odourless 
dye to a part of the animal’s body that it would not be able to see without a mirror, then introducing (or 
reintroducing) the mirror to see if the animal directs attention to the area dyed, thereby proving that it links the mirror 
image to its own self (Gallup 1970). Since the test is purely based on visual input, an animal’s failure to recognise itself 
is not proof that it lacks self-awareness, but if recognition occurs it is an indicator that the animal is capable of some 
sense of self. Interestingly, studies have also shown that at least some animals, including horses and sheep, are able to 
recognise individual human faces and even emotional expressions (Kendrick et al. 2001, Proops et al. 2018).	
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1987, cf. Saitta 1994). It is often placed as a dichotomous counterpart to domination, 
with associations with organised or class action against an oppressive elite. ‘Resistance’ 
becomes almost synonymous with oppression and miserable conditions on one part, and 
ill-intended power-plays on the other. That is not how resistance is used in this paper: 
equids were not planning an organised rebellion against their human oppressors. We 
might see something closer to Paynter and McGuire’s idea of “everyday resistance”, as in 
small everyday acts, which are in fact often invisible in the archaeological record (1991: 
12-13). This is a useful concept, but it maintains the dichotomous and strongly 
antagonistic meaning.  
While resistance can be an antagonistic response to violence or abuse, the relationship 
between human and animal is more complex and varied than that. Partly as a response to 
Ingold’s characterisation of domestication as domination (1994), Armstrong Oma refers 
to the relationship as a social contract (2010), albeit not a symmetrical one. In the 
examples discussed here, what we may detect are interactions of continuous negotiation 
between human and equid – also sometimes called ‘becoming with’ (Haraway 2008). 
Both are forced to rethink their behaviour based on the actions of the other; this can, but 
does not have to entail a desire to actually leave or even substantially change the 
relationship. Resistance means actively pushing back, acting against the limits set (by 
humans) in a particular encounter. It expresses a desire not to engage within the set 
parameters, along with attempts to alter those parameters, to a small or greater extent. It 
should be stressed that this is only one way among many others that animal agency can 
be expressed.4 But precisely because resistance is such a forceful assertion of agency, it 
serves as a good starting point for demonstrating one example of role of animals as social 
actors.  
 
Equids in the Bronze Age Near East 
Partly due to the diversity of animal agency, which it would be impossible to give due 
attention in a short study of this nature, I have chosen to focus on only one type of 
animal as a case study: equids. The other reason I have chosen this one animal is that the 
iconographic material of the ancient Near East pertaining to equids lends itself 
particularly well to suggesting a variety of roles and perceptions. I would emphasise again 
that I am not here concerned so much with how humans have used (and abused) animals 
as passive objects, or with how this is reflected in the iconography. Rather, I want to 
nudge the material to see how it might reveal something about the active influences that 
equids had on the people of the ancient Near East. That is, equids are seen as social 
actors in the sense that they actively and deliberately react to human contact, thereby 
being part of the forces that shape that relationship. 
Representational material of any kind exists within a complex set of ideological, cultural 
and historical parameters, coupled with artistic license and tradition. Interpreting it 
involves embodied and individual evaluation. The pieces discussed here are certainly not 
direct representations of ancient realities. 5  Instead, they are demonstrations of the 
knowledge of certain concepts. The depiction of the features discussed implies an 
                                                
4 As Dornan notes, agency is at times equated with resistance (2002: 318), which is an unfortunate and oversimplified 
view of the many different ways in which both humans and other animals interact with their environment. 
5 If nothing else, this is clear from a study of the details of some of the objects: for example, the paces of the equids do 
not reflect actual equid movement – a good example of artistic convention. 
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awareness of the existence of such features, whether they relate to tack or equid 
behaviour and gestures. Crucially, the behaviour depicted closely corresponds to how 
equids use gesture and body language, making it much more likely that this was actually 
observed and not conjured from the imagination of the craftspersons. Further, any 
meaning attached to these features comes from knowledge of this behaviour. Take the 
example of horses shown with open mouths (and perhaps a bit). The craftsperson may 
intend to convey the idea of a ‘spirited’ horse, eager to go: the meaning of this is lost 
without knowing that this is how a horse might react to the bit. 
 
Equids pushing back 
I want to suggest three ways in which equids can be seen to resist or ‘push back’ in their 
encounter with humans in the ancient Near East. These do not necessarily imply a 
complete rejection of the relationship, but they do illustrate degrees of animals carrying 
out actions in order to influence their situation or the condition they find themselves in.  
The first example comes from a certain type of equid terracotta figurine belonging to the 
second half of the third millennium BCE, with a few early second millennium examples, 
and mostly found in the Khabur region of Syria. The type seems limited to a few sites: 
Tell Mozan/Urkesh (Hauser 2007; Bianchi & Wissing 2009), Tell Brak/Nagar (Oates et 
al. 2001), and Tell Arbid (Makowski 2014; 2015).6 These figurines depict an equid which 
is clearly marked as male due to the presence of male genitals (figs. 1-3). Significantly, not 
only are the genitals marked, they are also covered by some kind of strap (most likely 
made of leather). Exactly how the strap stays on is not clear, but it may be attached to a 
more complex system of tack that extends up over the back of the equid, with additional 
straps to the front and the back (fig. 2). Whatever the means, it must have caused some 
difficulty keeping the device in place (not to mention challenging to attach in the first 
place), and very likely a source of discomfort for the equid. 
The strap is a means of controlling the equid. It has persuasively been interpreted as 
reflecting breeding practices (e.g. Hauser 2007: 373, Makowski 2014: 262). Precisely 
when the different species of equids were domesticated in the Near East is a matter of 
some debate, which I will not endeavour to cover here (for a detailed study, see Zarins 
2014). Certainly by the second half of the third millennium BCE, we have good evidence 
that selective breeding of equids took place, and that certain cities were famous for their 
equids. It is probably no coincidence that ancient Nagar was one of them (Eidem et al. 
2001: 101; Oates 2001: 286). This would have involved mostly domesticated equids, but 
it is possible that wild individuals, in particular onagers, were used to supplement the 
pedigree. In fact it seems that the most prestigious equid at this point was the kunga2, 
perhaps a donkey-onager hybrid (Postgate 1986). This would require capturing and 
managing wild onagers and persuading them to breed with the domestic donkeys.  
Whatever the details of the mechanisms of the breeding programmes, the figurines reveal 
that at least the stallions needed strong measures of control.7 These measures would only 
be necessary because the equids were resisting the human intervention and not 
immediately fitting into the human scheme of things. In other words, the equid 
                                                
6 One example is also reported from Tepe Gawra, dating to the Akkadian period (Speiser 1935: 69-70, pl. XXXIVc.5).	
7 The terracotta figurines are rarely marked as female, only a few examples are recorded from Tell Mozan (Hauser 
2007: 374), and Tell Arbid (Makowski 2015: 629).	
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behaviour forced humans to adapt and come up with alternative solutions. In this 
particular case, the solution (or at least one solution - we do not know if others were 
tested) appears both impractical and unpleasant, although the former is mostly a matter 
of conjecture.  
The second example is best expressed in half a dozen inlays, also dated to the second 
half of the third millennium BCE, from the site of ancient Mari on the Euphrates in 
eastern Syria (Margueron 2004: 291, 293, figs. 279a, 282.14, 282.16. 282.17, 282.18; 
Parrot 1967: pls. LXV nos. 2467, 2468, 3072). Unfortunately, none of the inlays are 
complete, but the fragments that do survive reveal astonishing details of equids pulling 
wheeled vehicles. They depict teams of equids, usually in fours (figs. 4-5). In the two-
dimensional media, equids are shown in profile, and to mark the number of animals, 
further outlines are simply shown along the lines of the front one. In contrast, a different 
perspective is used for humans, who are nearly always shown as separate complete 
individuals. The method used for the equids makes it clear that they are a team - on fig. 
4, clearly a team of four arranged shoulder to shoulder (in modern-day carriage driving, 
this would be a highly unusual arrangement; pairs of two would be preferable). The inlays 
clearly show the components of the bridle, with a simple headstall and noseband. The 
equids were controlled with lip rings, which is probably something that was adapted 
from their use with cattle (Littauer & Crouwel 1979: 30-31). Bits do not yet appear to 
have been widely known at this point.  
What I want to draw attention to here is what may at first appear to be a very broad 
noseband (fig. 4). Actually, it is so low and partly covering the nostrils that is it more 
likely a muzzle, or at least functioned as such.8 This becomes clearer in some instances 
where it does go all the way to the bottom of the lips of the equids (fig. 5). Along with 
the inlays, a number of equid terracotta figurines illustrate the same idea, where we can 
note patches of clay placed over the mouth of the animal (figs. 6-7). 
Different models seem to have been available, or perhaps experimented with: a broad 
band basically extending downwards from the noseband, to the nostrils or partly 
covering the nostrils (fig. 4); a patch covering only the lower part of the mouth, leaving 
the upper part (with nostrils) entirely free (fig. 5); and a patch or strap going from the 
front of the noseband over the mouth and to the back of the noseband, also leaving the 
nostrils free (figs. 6-7). The latter is only found on the figurines, but would also be 
difficult to render in the two-dimensional medium where only profiles were used. The 
first type is the only one which seems to be designed to impede breathing, and may 
therefore have the further function of subduing animals who are particularly 
temperamental. 
The main idea of the muzzle is to keep the mouths of the equids tight and prevent them 
from being able to bite. This may be protection for their human grooms and trainers, but 
is just as likely to be to avoid the equids bickering and biting each other. Such bickering 
might be particularly bad when dealing with a team of four stallions, as on the Standard 
of Ur (fig. 8), but can equally well occur with mares or even geldings. Unfortunately, the 
bodies of the equids are not preserved on the inlays from Mari that show the muzzles, 
and the same applies to the terracotta figurines, so it is not at present possible to 
determine if there is a direct correlation between the use of muzzles and the sex of the 
equids. 
                                                
8 See also Littauer 1969 for a discussion of the effect of low nosebands. 
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Equids can bite for a number of reasons, not all of which are related to aggression. The 
point is that the action was deemed undesirable by humans and therefore limiting 
measures were applied. To what extent the muzzle was an effective response to this type 
of pushing back is not known. It does not appear to have continued into the second 
millennium BCE, which may be related to other changes occurring in human-equid 
relations at that time (for example, the use of the bit and two reins and the increasing 
popularity of horses for pulling wheeled vehicles). 
The third form of pushing back is also the most tentative as it depends on the degree to 
which one believes ancient craftspersons to reflect reality in their work, and to be able to 
reflect the ‘body language’ of animals. A careful look at the many depictions of equids in 
front of wheeled vehicles in glyptics and on plaques or inlays and terracotta figurines 
wearing bridles reveals that in many cases, tension is marked in the positioning of the 
neck and head. This tension is almost certainly a reaction to the bridle elements (nose/lip 
ring, noseband and/or bit) and them being pulled by the driver (or potentially in some 
cases, a rider).  
The tension can be detected by noticing the angle of the neck to the body and the 
ground, and the angle of the head both in relation to the neck and in the relation to the 
ground. Normally, if an equid is not grazing, it will hold its head at a roughly 30-40 
degree angle to the ground and its body - horses tend to have a higher set neck than 
donkeys, especially some modern breeds. The head would then be roughly 90 degrees in 
relation to the neck (fig. 9). In the gallop, the neck may come up and down a bit, 
following the rhythm of the movement, as the animal uses the neck for balance.  
In many of the depictions, we see the neck placed at almost 90 degree angles to the body 
of the equid. This is apparent in some of the third millennium plaques and inlays already 
presented. The so-called Standard of Ur may serve as an example by comparing the 
equids on each of the long sides. On the ‘Peace’ side (fig. 8a), the team of four equids are 
walking; they are being led by a person walking in front of them, and are not pulling a 
vehicle. Their necks are set slightly higher that might be expected (at a roughly 50 degree 
angle), but not so extreme as to express strong opposition. On the ‘War’ side (fig. 8b), 
the teams of equids in the lowest register display a different attitude: their necks are very 
high, close to the 90 degree angle. The discomfort is even more evident on a plaque from 
Nippur (fig. 10), where the bulging of the front of the neck and the open mouth 
emphasise the tension. The open mouth is a common reaction to the bit in equids, but 
here it instead reveals a reaction to the pressure of the pull of the lip ring and/or 
noseband. Similar features can be detected in some of the terracotta figurines (see e.g. 
Meyer & Pruß 1994: 127, no. 199, fig, 38, pl. 17; Mallowan 1937: 130, fig. 10.24; 
Strommenger & Miglus 2010: 64, pl. 61.2). 
The behaviour seems to have been observed throughout the third and second millennia 
BCE, but it again more clearly appears in the Late Bronze Age on objects with some 
degree of inspiration from Egyptian art (and from sites geographically closer to Egypt). 
Egyptian depictions of horses and chariots often show the tension as rather extreme, 
with high bulging necks, head curled close to the neck, and the tension continuing all the 
way down the spine (fig. 11). Similar compositions appear on gold vessels found at 
Ugarit (fig. 12, and Louvre AO 17208). At this point in time, the equids are generally 
horses, and the bit has become more commonly known. The reaction in the neck is 
therefore related to the pulling of the bit, with the open mouth emphasising this.   
What we see in these examples is equids attempting to resist the pull of their human 
drivers. In these cases, the resistance is either through pushing on the bit or the 
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noseband with the gums or front of the head, or through avoidance, pushing the head 
backwards. The variety and development in bridles and bridle elements (including bits) 
illustrate that this pushing resulted in a negotiation between human and equid, with 
humans trying to find the most efficient way of persuading equids to follow and 
understand instructions (a negotiation that is in many ways ongoing today). As we have 
seen with the noseband, the effect on the equid depends very much on the type of bridle 
and bit. Experimentation with this can also be seen when the metal bit becomes more 
common, as discussed in detail by Littauer (1969). For example, studs on the inside of 
the bit rings/guards (what Littauer calls cheekpieces) may provoke a more immediate 
response, and riders today will use a combination of specific bridle and bit types to suit 
the temperament of each horse.    
I mentioned that the interpretation of this ‘body language’ is tentative, so what might be 
the alternative(s)? Many aspects of Near Eastern art are very standardised, and certain 
features remain the same from the beginning of the third millennium through the first 
millennium BCE. For example, the teams of equids in front of chariots and other 
wheeled vehicles are always shown as overlapping, not individually rendered animals. The 
way animals are shown as walking or galloping also remains quite constant (and this 
applies to other animals as well). The high neck could thus be put down to artistic 
convention. However, far from all equids - or indeed other animals - are shown with the 
high, tensioned neck. In fact, some Old Babylonian images of ridden equids show a 
relaxed neck and head (e.g. Legrain 1930: 32, pl. LII no. 277). These are closely 
associated with a loose rope that is not being pulled hard, at least in the moment 
captured, and this may be a clue as to why the equids appear more relaxed.  
The images from the Late Bronze Age suggest a more complex situation. Since they are 
all of horses, we are dealing with a neck that may be set higher naturally. Depicting the 
head and neck as raised so high seems indeed to be an Egyptian convention. This 
convention does reflect actual behaviour in that it also frequently shows the open mouth 
reaction to the bit, but it may be more than that. It may be a way precisely to make a 
clear distinction between horses and other equids;9 it is also possible that the high neck 
was associated with particularly prestigious horses (even a certain breed, or coming from 
a specific ‘stable’). Beside the element of resistance, whatever the initial reasoning behind 
the convention, it appears to have trickled into some of the objects created in the Levant, 
and may also have something to do with the way horses are consistently shown with 
exaggerated high necks in Mycenaean art. 
These three examples all concern equid reaction to tack invented by humans to manage 
equid behaviour. In a sense, it could be argued that all tack is a reflection of equids 
pushing back, and to a degree this would indeed be the case. It is at least the case to the 
extent that all tack per definition involves a human-equid relationship, and all tack is a 
part of the negotiation of that relationship. I have here chosen to emphasise elements 
that reveal a stronger sense of the equid actually resisting, and that have forced a change 
in human behaviour. For example, genital straps would not have been applied the minute 
humans first caught or domesticated equids, or decided to carry out selective breeding. 
They are a human solution to equids being equids. Likewise, bridles, lip/nose rings, bits 
and muzzles are responses to equids pushing back and not immediately fitting within the 
restrictions set by humans. To what extent the equid resistance was successful is a 
                                                
9 This is done in other ways as well, especially when the horse was fairly new and the artist needed to be explicit that a 
different animal was depicted (Lonneke Delpeut, pers. comm., 30 Nov 2018).	
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question for another time, but what is clear is that it did result in re-negotiations of the 
relationship, even if the relationship is unlikely to have been a symmetrical one.  
 
Conclusion  
My aim with this paper is two-fold: 1) to provide an overview of the concept of animals 
as social actors, and 2) to offer examples of how animal agency might be recognised in 
the material culture, in this instance primarily from the third millennium BCE Near East. 
Animal actors are seen as having the capacity to actively attempt to shape their lives 
through interaction with their surroundings, in particular in their relations to humans. 
The cases demonstrating equids pushing back and thus influencing the relationship 
discussed here are those of breeding controls in the form of genital straps on stallions, 
the use of muzzles to prevent biting, and the occurrence of tension expressed in the 
‘body language’ of depicted equids. In order to offer a clearly delimited case study, I have 
focussed on iconographic evidence for these examples, but other examples could be 
drawn from examining faunal remains, archaeological contexts associated with equids, 
and textual references to equid management and behaviour. These may also reveal other 
types of equid social action. 
The examples are pieces in the huge jigsaw puzzle that is the past. They are a kind of 
‘close up’ and do not constitute a grand narrative on their own. But they are – or should 
be – part of the grand narrative of, say, the Bronze Age of the Near East. The small 
changes that equid resistance and continued social negotiations may have caused are 
important for individual or specific encounters, but they also have greater and longterm 
implications. A resistance to the lip ring and its inefficiency in communicating direction 
may have lead to experimentation with other forms of tack, including the bit. Ultimately, 
and whatever their origin, these new devices heralded great changes in warfare; 
understanding equids as social actors is thus revealing of even large and longterm 
processes. 
Archaeological studies tend to be deeply anthropocentric. There is one excellent reason 
for this: archaeology without humans would no longer be archaeology. However, 
abandoning or moving away from a strong anthropocentric approach does not need to 
entail abandoning humans. If it instead is a de-centering that places humans in their 
environment - with every micro-relationship that that implies - we have a real 
opportunity to greatly enrich our understanding and knowledge of all aspects of the past 
and the archaeological record. This is not a call for a flat ontology in the sense that all 
things and beings have equal value - whether or not they do, they clearly have not been 
perceived or treated as such. These asymmetries or unequal relations are part of the 
understanding of humans and how we negotiate, assert or relinquish our place within 
each relationship. The specific study of animals as social actors is then part of the 
understanding of how animals actively negotiate, assert or resist their place in relations to 
humans, and how this affects human behaviour and lifeways.  
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